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Abstract— Molecular biology provides the ability to 
implement forms of information and network security completely 
outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms.  
This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power 
of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich 
source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can 
be adopted to use in the information and electronic 
communication domains. Conventional security protocols are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly 
capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. 
Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering 
and substandard implementations by IT organizations. 
Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak 
points with the current security approaches. Future advances in 
instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to 
advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated 
system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time expression and 
assay of gene expression products.   
Keywords—network security; gene expression; transcription 
factors; translation;  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Network security is a vital component of the design of any 
network. There are five main requirements to be addressed in 
developing a secure network: Authentication, confidentiality, 
data integrity, non-repudiation, and access control. In vivo, 
biomolecular cellular systems of gene expression authenticate 
themselves through various means such as transcription factors 
and promoter sequences. These factors also enforce access 
control. They have means of retaining confidentiality of the 
meaning of genome sequences through processes such as 
control of protein expression. They are capable of establishing 
data integrity and non-repudiation through transcriptional and 
translational controls.  
A suite of genomics and proteomics based authentication 
and confidentiality protocols are being developed to augment 
traditional network security approaches with concepts from 
molecular biology via the regulation of gene expression. These 
protocols are agnostic to their implementation and can be 
incorporated into any existing network security protocol 
(Secure http, SSL, TLS, IPSec, etc.) or any future network 
security strategy. The protocols can be implemented for 
implementing web-based security strategies, digital signatures, 
digital rights management, and general purpose encryption for 
data in motion or data at rest. 
Initial implementations will utilize the cryptographic 
algorithms described below. Future implementations will take 
advantage of the ability to access patterns of gene expression in 
vivo. Knowledge of gene expression products (proteins and 
non-coding RNA) can be achieved without time consuming 
sequence assays. It can be done via techniques such as 
fluorescent labeling. In fact the use of fluorescence is one 
method of implementing a protein expression security protocol. 
These protocols will provide new challenges for network 
attackers by forcing them to work in both the information 
security domain and the molecular biology domain. Although 
no security strategy is without vulnerabilities, the intent of this 
work is to present a completely new set of problems for 
network attackers which will result in higher network and 
information security. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MOLECULAR BIOLOGICALLY BASED 
SECURITY PROTOCOL 
Implementation of this approach utilizes the following 
concepts: 
 A network security concept of operations based upon 
the processes of gene expression. 
 A methodology for taking the processes of gene 
expression and converting them into cryptographic 
protocols (ciphergenes become analogs for biological 
genes, cipherproteins become analogs for biological 
proteins) 
 Specific coding models for the cryptographic protocols 
 Cryptographically hard sources for the patterns of gene 
expression  called ciphercolonies. (ciphercolonies 
become analogs for colonies of living organisms but 
can also contain algorithms substituting for living 
organisms ) 
 Ultimate merging of security protocols with in vivo and 
in vitro realizations of ciphercolonies. Networks of 
ciphercolonies capable of signaling and responding to 
patterns of gene expression within a network and 
authenticating members of the network. 
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Security is based upon the translation of plaintext messages 
to and from a computationally large set of genomic and 
proteomic messages. Instead of relying solely on the four 
nucleotides and 20 amino acids as a code base, messages are 
generated from genomic and proteomic sequences that include 
the informational representation of the regulatory elements of 
transcription and translational networks. A single sequence can 
generate many messages depending upon the transcription and 
translation instructions. Modules can be developed and 
implemented in large or small systems, firewalls, routers, 
switches and other devices. Ultimately, the goal is a network of 
biologically enabled nodes and Certificate Authorities who can 
establish trust via evolving patterns of gene expression. Like 
any security protocol, the most efficient implementation 
requires accommodating its features early in the design phase. 
To accomplish that goal, designers must understand the key 
concepts and future IT security departments will require 
molecular biologists and biochemists on their staffs. 
A. Gene Expression Nomenclature 
The processes of transcription and translation are coded 
into a protocol  that assigns each functional region of a 
relevant molecule a code derived using the Method of Types 
from information theory [1]. For the process of transcription 
the protocol focuses on the interaction between regulatory 
sequences in the gene, transcription factors that must bind to 
the gene, and the enzyme that binds to the entire complex to 
perform transcription from DNA to messenger RNA. The 
analogy in the protocol is series of codes from the Method of 
Types. There can be a code for each of the regulatory 
sequences, transcription factors, and enzyme. The interaction 
between codes is defined by a joint probability matrix for the 
intersection of 2 or more codes. The intersection of the codes 
is analogous to a binding interaction. In the encryption step, 
all of those interactions are specified. In the decryption step, 
the receiver decodes those interactions using the same joint 
probability distributions as the sender. An example is shown 
in fig. 1 [2]. There are six general transcription factor proteins 
(TFIIA, TFIIB, TFIID, TFIIE, TFIIF, TFIIH) shown. There 
are five regulatory sequences on the gene (BRE, TATA, INR, 
MTE, DPE). A set of interactions are defined for this 
transcriptional complex a subset of which is shown in table 1.  
 
Fig. 1. Coding the transcriptional complex 
TABLE I.  SAMPLE OF EVENT JOINT PROBABILITIES FOR 
TRANSCRIPTIONAL COMPLEX 
Event (Protein-DNA) 
TFIIA BRE 
TFIIA  TATA 
TFIIBBRE 
TFIIBTATA 
TFIIEINR 
TFIIE∩MTE 
TFIIA  TATA 
  
B. Application of the Method of Types   
If we define the relationship between protein transcription 
factor and regulatory sequence in terms of jointly typical sets 
of the two sequences, then different levels of homology can be 
required in different authentication or confidentiality 
scenarios. As an example: Let  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, a 5-tuple 
alphabet for regulatory sequences with Type g , 10 digits in 
length, consisting of the distribution shown in table 2. 
TABLE II.  EXAMPLE OF A TYPE   DEFINTION  
Pg1=0.2 
Pg2=0.4 
Pg3=0.1 
Pg4=0.1 
Pg5=0.2 
 
The type class of g consists of all sequences within  with 
the same statistical distribution, as shown in (1). 
        T(g)={1122223455,…,554322221}                           (1) 
Codes from T(g) can be defined for different transcription 
factors of the family TFII. Then the binding criteria is defined 
as the mutual information between sets of codes using joint 
probability distributions. This is shown as the intersection 
between the codes. The concept includes all interactions 
between protein codes and nucleotide codes. Codes without 
interactions have joint probabilities that yield the null set. 
The power of the Method of Types is that it allows for a 
certain amount of statistical variability in the interaction of the 
codes which mimics the variability of cellular interactions. 
Table 1 provides an example of the interpretation of binding 
of the general transcription factor proteins to a ciphergene 
gene undergoing encryption or decryption. In fig.1 all of the 
transcription factor proteins must bind to the correct gene 
regulatory sequences and other transcription factor proteins to 
permit RNA Polymerase II to bind to the entire complex and 
perform transcription. From a coding perspective, all of the 
codes for these factors have a defined probabilities of code 
intersection that signal successful authentication and permit 
subsequent operations of encryption or decryption to occur. 
Fig. 2 depicts a mobile, ad-hoc network (MANET) of six 
users challenging an incoming user. In this case, the challenge 
is to provide a coded response representing the network 
diagram shown in fig. 1. In this case the responder with 
ciphergene Z must know each cipherprotein-cipherprotein 
interaction and each cipherprotein-ciphergene interaction and 
only respond with the valid interactions. Then each of the six 
existing members decodes the response for their specific 
cipherprotein-cipherprotein and ciphergene interactions to 
determine admission to the network. In this example, using 
fig.1 as a guide, User A codes the cipherprotein-cipherprotein 
code intersection for TFIIATFIIB and the cipherprotein-
ciphergene code intersection for TFIIABRE and 
TFIAATATA. Those codes are sent as the MANET 
challenge to a user who supposedly possesses ciphergene Z, 
who responds to User A with the individual code types for 
TFIIA, TFIIB, BRE and TATA. All other users perform the 
same function for their respective cipherprotein-ciphergene and 
cipherprotein-cipherprotein codes. Successful completion by 
holder of ciphergene Z allows admission to the MANET. 
 
Fig. 2. MANET Authentication with general transcription factor and gene 
regulatory sequence coding 
C. Design of the Genomic and Proteomic Protocol suite 
1. Coding of sequences as objects. 
An object is defined as a genomic or proteomic sequence. 
It could be sequence defined at the nucleotide base level (e.g. 
AGGCT…) the  codon level, (AAG, TTA, CGC, …), 
transcription factor/ binding site  (SP1, CCAT, AP2,…), 
protein transcription factor  (TFIIA, TFIIB,…) , and so forth. 
Each object is drawn from the elements in a dictionary set 
associated with that object, for example: 
 Nucleotides:  {A, T, C, G, U, I, MeC, X, H} A, G, C, 
and T represent the main DNA bases adenine, guanine, 
cytosine, and thymine. MeC represents 5-
Methylcytosine, an epigenetic marker, H represents 
hypoxanthine, and X represents xanthine. H and X are 
mutagenic deaminations of DNA bases that 
occasionally occur in gene sequences. 
 DNA Codons:  {ATT, ATC, …, , TGA} 
 Transcription factors: TF ={TFII, TBP, …} 
 
Associated with each dictionary is a set of class elements 
that describe the function of an element in a given sequence. 
For the set of nucleotides, N, the classes might be: 
 Regulatory elements: {Promoter, Upstream Activator, 
TATA, Exon, Intron, …} 
2. High-level implementation summary 
First, there is a level 1 process by which DNA text is 
mapped into the structure of a gene complete with introns, 
exons, regulatory regions, etc., to create a ciphergene.  The 
purpose of this coding from a security perspective is that a 
single sequence of letters from a small alphabet can be used to 
represent a large set of permutations of message combinations. 
Multiple messages can be encoded into a single ciphergene. 
 
Fig. 3.Biological gene structure with a pre-coding instantiation of the DNA 
text message 
The decoding of such messages represents an np-hard 
problem for attackers. Fig. 3 provides a simple example of how 
the encoding process begins. In a real application the message 
could be spread across the control regions and different 
messages could be encoded simultaneously across different 
regions.  
Level 1 can be used as an off-ramp and transmitted to the 
receiver or proceed to level 2. Level 2 processes take the 
ciphergene code through a series of protein transcription factor 
code operations that combine with their counterpart regulatory 
codes on the ciphergene to produce a new coded sequence that 
represents a coded transcriptional complex.  
Similarly, level 2 can be used as an off-ramp and 
transmitted to the receiver  or proceed to level 3. Level 3 
processes are a series of operations that takes the coded 
transcriptional complex, through a series of operations using 
protein and RNA polymerase codes resulting in a basal 
transcriptional complex code. The basal transcriptional 
complex code is processed by algorithms and maps the code 
into a messenger RNA code, called the cipher-mRNA code. 
The cipher-mRNA now consists only of codons of the original 
DNA text message and is translated into a protein code, called 
the cipherprotein.  
The output of level 3 is the cipherprotein code that is 
transmitted from the sender to the receiver. The receiver 
applies the decryption keys to recover the cipher-mRNA and 
then perform all subsequent steps to reach level 2, level 1, and 
decoding to produce the plaintext. The protocol uses a series of 
encryption and decryption matrices, a series of encryption keys 
derived from pre-shared secret genomic sequences and 
additional tools from information theory to accomplish coding, 
encrypting, decoding and decrypting the successive levels of 
data [3]. 
III. ESTABLISHING AND UTILIZING PATTERNS OF GENE 
EXPRESSION 
A. Utilization of gene expression pathways 
A pattern of gene expression is created by an organism 
going through the processes of DNA transcription and RNA 
translation across the many genes within the genome. Genes 
are always expressed within the context of overall cellular 
requirements. Thus, genes are expressed in response to stimuli 
indicating a need for expression. Not all genes are expressed all 
the time. This introduces a temporal element into the security. 
An attacker might know which organisms are the basis of the 
security system, but not necessarily have knowledge of when 
genes are expressed in response to given stimuli. The more 
complex the organism, the greater the diversity of the pattern 
of gene expression which will contribute to diffusion and 
confusion of the codes generated by the protocols. Mutation 
processes increase the security provided these protocols 
because cryptanalysis of the text cannot be fully relied upon 
the retrieve the plaintext. And mutations do not always modify 
the sequence of an expressed protein. 
The factors of mutation and temporal gene expression can 
be used to increase the overall security of a system. 
B. Implementation of the protocols in living systems. 
These protocols are designed for eventual implementation 
in cellular organisms and colonies, when the technology is 
ready. By keeping the coding rules consistent with mechanics 
of gene expression, it is expected that there will eventually be 
instruments that read the cryptographic instructions and 
produce gene expression products in vivo. Networks will 
interface with each other over time, such that, as a minimum a 
level of phenotypic recognition can be established between 
networks. Mutation and variation play an important role in the 
security aspects. A Man-In-The-Middle attacker that has not 
been in constant contact with the colonies will be unable to 
match the patterns of gene expression that have evolved over 
time between 2 or more networks that recognize each other. 
This leads to self-authenticating network interactions as shown 
in fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Network Concept of Operations using regulation of gene expression 
 
Networks would have appliance, called a Network BioID. 
Enterprises will maintain Network BioIDs that communicate 
with each other via communication channels (the algorithm 
channel). The ciphercolonies are regularly sampled to measure 
their patterns of gene expression and receive external stimuli 
to modify those patterns of expression. Patterns of gene 
expression occur with the expression of multiple genes which 
interact with each other. Gene A, produces protein A, which 
effects the expression of gene B, which produces protein B, 
etc. This creates a series of gene regulatory networks. In vivo, 
these regulatory networks appear in close proximity to each 
other, within the same cell, or colony of cells through a 
process of cellular signaling. In a computer network, that 
proximity need not be a physical proximity, but a 
communications channel. In vivo, the genes all exist in a 
physical sense within the nucleus or cellular compartment 
housing the DNA. In a computer network, some genes can 
exist in a virtual sense and these genes can communicate with 
the physical ones via a signaling process which alters the 
patterns of expression in both algorithmic and live 
participants.  
Security rests upon maintaining continual knowledge of 
the state of gene expression of the underlying colonies and 
their interactions. For an initial implementation, it is possible 
to monitor and record patterns of gene expression in a 
laboratory over a long baseline period of time, (e.g. 1 year) 
and use that recorded data in place of real-time knowledge of 
patterns of gene expression. Additional data would be 
collected in parallel with consuming the recorded data is being 
consumed, while maintaining a one year reserve of gene 
expression data. 
C. Incorporation into legacy networks 
A new concept such as the ones proposed in this research 
will not be accepted unless it can be interfaced into legacy, 
non-bio capable networks.  In fig.5. Alice and Bob are shown 
using genomic and proteomic authentication in conjunction 
with IPsec. In this case Alice and Bob have Network BioIDs 
incorporating algorithmic and live sources of gene expression 
and a verification method using fluorescence pattern matching 
when gene expression is forced by appropriate stimuli. 
Alice and Bob can perform IPsec using nonces and keys 
derived from patterns of gene expression in their 
ciphercolonies unknown to them and to Eve. Alice and Bob 
can perform authentication via messages directing the receiver 
to force expression of gene(s) which can be detected optically 
via fluorescence, successfully as in case (a), or unsuccessfully 
as in case (b). Alice and Bob can send genomically or 
proteomically encrypted messages that cannot be decrypted 
without knowledge of the patterns of gene expression used as 
the basis of encryption. Every network node can be equipped 
with a Network BioID. Eve will need a background in 
molecular biology and cryptography as well as lab resources to 
attack this protocol. Coded patterns of fluorescence detection 
of gene expression can be formed and utilized with current 
technology. This type of security will require organizations to 
take on functions and capabilities very different from those 
currently used in IT departments. 
  
Fig. 5. Combined legacy and genomic protocol security 
D. Proteomic Authentication Messages 
An IT security official receives a remote request for access 
to network assets from a remote user. The security official 
sends the user a message coded as a protein sequence, by a 
regulatory network using a message-specific set of protein-
DNA Type codes and a source coding scheme based upon a 
keyed hash function tied to a specific genome. The user 
successfully decrypts the message and returns the plaintext 
(which could be encrypted if desired) to the IT security 
official. The IT security official then sends a set of access 
credentials encrypted with a different protein and a different 
genome for the keyed hash code. The user successfully 
decrypts the message to gain access to the network. In this 
scheme, an attacker needs multiple levels of information at the 
genomic and proteomic levels to be able to decode the 
message by cryptanalysis means alone. The process is 
summarized in fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Protein Coded Authentication Challenge 
 
IV. ASPECTS OF PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Technologies for integrating the protocols with laboratory 
analysis of gene expression 
The US Patent that has been secured on the technology is 
forward looking and assumes that full implementation will 
involve future technological advancements that will enhance 
the implementation concepts in the form of laboratory-on-a-
chip devices [4]. The goal of real-time, lab-on-a-chip assays 
for gene expression has already been realized [5].  It is also 
currently possible to use techniques such as dielectrophoretic 
separation of assay products to create signatures of gene 
expression which can be used to create cryptographic codes 
with the genomic and proteomic protocols and low-cost 
devices such as the one shown in fig. 7 [6]. 
Fig. 8 is a concept of operations for implementing the 
protocols within a legacy-style PKI system.  The purple boxes 
on each slide refer to blocks in the BioID ciphercolony which 
may or may not be local to the user computer performing 
encryption. The ciphergene ID (CID) is essentially an index 
that points to the name of gene whose sequence, transcription, 
and translation features are used in the encryption process. 
The DNA text message is embedded into the gene sequence 
by the source coding protocol previously described. A given 
message can be encoded differently by inserting it into 
different genes. 
B. Example of implementing protocols into a Public Key 
Infrastructure using a Bio-Certificate Authority 
The Sender decrypts the GSK with its private key and 
retrieves the locus control region key (Bio-LCR) from the 
BioID ciphercolony database.  The Bio-LCR is decrypted with 
the GSK.  The DNA text is encrypted with the Bio-LCR, 
converting the DNA text to a ciphergene. The CID is 
encrypted with the public key of the sender and concatenated 
with the ciphergene.  This completes Level 1 encryption.  The 
ciphertext message can be sent to the receiver or sent to level 
2 for further processing. 
The level 1 process is as follows: The Sender encrypts the 
CID with a Bio-CA generated public key and transmits the 
encrypted CID to a remote Bio-CA.  The Bio-CA decrypts the 
CID with its private key and retrieves a Gene Sequence Key 
Encryption Key (GSK) for the message associated with the 
CID.  The Bio-CA encrypts the GSK with the Sender’s public 
key and transmits the GSK to the Sender.   
 
Fig. 7. Dielectrophoretic Separation Test MEMS 
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Fig. 8. A Public Key Infrastructure implementation using Bio-Certificate Authorities 
